Cracking the "Health Care Liability" Nut

The Texas Legislature may have defined what constitutes a Health Care Liability claim, but as is so often true, facts and circumstances are not always as cut-and-dried as a black-letter definition.  The Austin Court of Appeals grappled with this sticky issue in Drewery v. Adventist Health System/Texas Inc.  In this case, Planitiff Drewery brought suit for an assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress stemming from actions of the defendants that occurred while he was under general anesthesia.  Drewery was employed by Adventist Health System/Texas, Inc.  He was admitted as a patient for a tonsillectomy and two co-workers were assigned to assist with the surgery.  When Drewery awoke from the anesthesia, he discovered that his co-workers had painted his fingernails and toenails with pink nail polish, had written on the bottom of his feet, and had wrapped his thumb with tape.  He alleged that their intentional actions subsequently caused a hostile work environment and severe emotional distress.  The trial court concluded that Drewery's claims were Health Care Liability claims and dismissed because he filed no expert reports.

On appeal, a majority of the panel held that the claims were not Health Care Liability Claims.  The majority considered the factors set out in the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in Diversicare General Partner, Inc. v. Rubio.  Noting that Drewery had not pleaded damages based upon any physical injury, that the claims were for intentional acts as opposed to negligent acts, and that expert testimony was not required to address the standard of care, the majority held that Drewery was not required to furnish an expert report.  The majority's opinion may be found here.

Justice Melissa Goodwin dissented on the ground that the majority had examined Drewery's pleaded claims as they were presented in an amended petition.  Justice Goodwin argued that Drewery's original petition more closely asserted claims that would be defined as "Health Care Liability Claims" and that Drewery could not avoid the expert report filing requirement by amending his petition after the time expired for filing such reports.  The dissenting opinion may be found here.

Attorney as witness does not compel disqualification

The San Antonio Court of Appeals reaffirmed that the fact that an attorney for one of the parties may also be a witness does not require disqualification under Rule 3.08 of the Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.  In this case, counsel for the relator was a potential witness with knowledge of some arguably relevant facts.  The Real Party in Interest filed a motion to disqualify Relator's counsel pursuant to Rule 3.08, which the trial court granted.  Relator filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to vacate the trial court's order.  In an opinion by Chief Justice Catherine Stone (left), the court of appeals held that "[t]he fact that a lawyer serves as both an advocate and a witness does not, standing alone, compel disqualification."    The court reiterated that (1) the lawyer's testimony must be necessary to establish an "essential fact" on the client's behalf, and (2) the opposing party must demonstrate it would suffer actual prejudice as a result of the lawyer's dual roles as advocate and witness.  Because neither was shown in this case, the court granted relator's petition for writ of mandamus.  The court's opinion in In re Tipps can be found here.

Appellate Continuing Education Opportunities

Got a couple of good Appellate CLE opportunities coming up: