Opinions & Judgments

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If the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution bars your suit against a State, maybe the U.S. Government can bring the suit for you.  That’s what happened in EEOC v. Board of Supervisors for the University of Louisiana System. 

Dr. Van McGraw initially filed an age discrimination suit against the University of Louisiana System ("ULS"), after ULS implemented a new policy prohibiting the re-employment of retirees on a regular full-time basis.  McGraw was ultimately unsuccessful.

After McGraw unsuccessfully attempted to be rehired by ULS as an associate dean or as a professor, he filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC.  The EEOC took up his claim and filed an action against ULS seeking injunctive relief and relief for the benefit of McGraw.  ULS filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Eleventh Amendment barred the proceedings.  After the district court denied the motions, ULS filed an interlocutory appeal.Continue Reading Eleventh Amendment Doesn’t Bar the Government from Suing a State

Assume a foreign insurance company provides auto insurance cards that specifically cover accidents both in the home country and the United States.  If a car accident occurs in Texas, can the insurer avoid personal jurisdiction in the suit by alleging that it did not purposefully avail itself to Texas?

This was the issue before the Dallas Court of Appeals in Assurances Generales Banque Nationale v. Dhalla.Continue Reading In case you’re ever in a car accident with someone insured by a foreign insurance company…

After reading Combs v. Kaufman County, I can’t help but wonder if there is something missing from the Court’s opinion or if the opinion contains an error.  Nontheless, I was surprised to learn about a rarely-invoked provision of the Texas Constitution that allows parties to a suit to pick their own judge.

Article V, Section 16 of the Texas Constitution  provides that when the judge of a county court is disqualified, "the parties interested may, by consent, appoint a proper person to try said case."  In Combs, the presiding judge of the Kaufman County Constitutional Court apparently disqualified herself from hearing a guardianship for Wallace Darst.  [Note, the opinion uses the term "recused," which has a different legal meaning, but from the facts, it appears the Court meant to use the term "disqualified"].   The parties subsequently asked Judge Glen Ashworth, who was then district judge for the 86th Judicial District Court, to preside over the guardianship.  Here, the opinion is somewhat confusing or inconsistent as to whether Judge Ashworth merely presided as judge for the constitutional county court or whether the case was treated as having been transferred to the 86th District Court, with Judge Ashworth presiding as judge of that court.  Judge Ashworth subsequently awarded the guardian (Combs) a fee of $143,168.95 and that order was not appealed.Continue Reading Subject-matter Jurisdiction and Consent

The Dallas Court of Appeals recently had an opportunity to review and apply the mootness doctrine with respect to appeals and, in the process, expound on the rarely invoked exception to mootness known as "capable of repetition, yet evading review" (CORYER).  In this case, the Plaintiff sought a temporary injunction and declaratory judgment that Duncanville’s ordinance…

A court appointing a receiver has exclusive jurisdiction over property subject to the receivership. When does the court’s exclusive jurisdiction end? The court must either relinquish its jurisdiction or order the receiver to restore the property to those entitled to it.

Proper relinquishment of exclusive jurisdiction was the main issue of a recent San Antonio Court of Appeals case: Chimp Haven, Inc. v. Primarily Primates, Inc. You can read the opinion here.

Continue Reading Court Doesn’t Monkey Around With Exclusive Jurisdiction

 Void orders of a trial court may occur in a number of different circumstances.  The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals discusses one such circumstance in Silguero v. State.

The trial court dismissed the State’s action for forfeiture for want of prosecution and the State timely filed a motion to reinstate, but the motion was not verified.  More than 30 days after the dismissal, the trial court granted the motion to reinstate.  The trial court subsequently rendered a judgment of forfeiture and the Silgueros filed an appeal as well as a petition for writ of mandamus, each asserting that the trial court’s order of reinstatement was void.Continue Reading Challenging Void Orders and Motion to Reinstate