In prior posts, Byron Henry and I have opined on a split among the intermediate courts of appeals regarding whether 41.0105 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code abrogates the collateral source rule and whether evidence of medically expenses initially incurred but ultimately written off should be excluded from evidence at trial or applied post-verdict by the trial court.  The Texas Supreme Court resolved both issues today in an opinion affirming the Tyler court of appeals’ judgment in Haygood v. Garza

The main take-away is that amounts written-off by providers must be excluded from evidence at trial.  In other words, the jury should only see evidence of medical expenses actually and ultimately charged to the claimant, not bills showing initial charges before required write-offs.  The majority opinion may be found here.  Justice Lehrmann’s dissent, in which Justice Medina joined, may be found here.

 Additional take-aways you need to know before your next trial, however, are below:Continue Reading 41.0105 Debate Resolved — Hooray!

A lot has already been written about the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes opinion decided this week, but there’s one little ditty that class action practitioners will want to take note of.

As part of their motion for class certification, the Plaintiffs used an expert who conducted a social framework analysis of the culture and

The Texas Supreme Court has revisited statutory standard for determining when a parent is unemployed or underemployed for purposes of determining child support obligations.

Section 154.066 of the Texas Family Code provides that "[i]f the actual income of the obligor is significantly less than what the obligor could earn because of intentional unemployment or underemployment

The Fourteenth District Court of Appeals in Houston has held that a corporation’s jurisdictional contacts could not be imputed to a nonresident that succeeded to the corporation’s contract rights.

Under the core facts in Motor Components LLC v. Devon Energy Corp., Pennzoil Company, a Delaware corporation located in Texas, contracted with its subsidiary, Purolator Products Company, a Delaware corporation located in Oklahoma.  Under the contract, Pennzoil agreed to indemnify Purolator for certain remediation costs of Purolator’s real property located in New York and Michigan.  Motor Components, which is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New York, succeeded to Purolator’s rights under the contract by transactions not described in the appellate record.  Motor Components subsequently invoked certain provisions of the contract and called upon Pennzoil’s successor-in-interest, Devon Energy Corporation, to respond.  Devon is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Oklahoma.  Devon then filed a declaratory judgment action in Texas and sought personal jurisdiction over Motor Components.Continue Reading Personal Jurisdiction in Contract Case with Successor in Interest