Vicarious liability under Chapter 33

The Dallas Court of Appeals has explained how to submit jury questions for negligence of employees for whose conduct employers may be held vicariously liable.

 In Janga v. Colombrito, two defendant doctors appealed an adverse jury verdict and complained that the trial court had not submitted the liability of two nurses as part of the liability question.  The appellate court first had to decide whether the nurses were "settling persons" under Chapter 33 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.  The court held that the nurses were settling persons.  Even though the nurses did not themselves pay money, their employer--the hospital--did pay money on their behalf and the nurses were parties to a settlement agreement whereby they were dismissed from the case.  The hospital would have had vicarious liability for the nurses' alleged negligence.

Next, the court examined the record to determine if there was some evidence of the nurses' negligence and concluded that there was some evidence.  Thus, the court held that it was error to omit them from the list of parties whose negligence should have been decided by the jury.  Noting that when there is a respondeat superior claim submitted, the individual employee defendant's negligence is submitted, rather than that of the employer.  The court concluded there is no reason to treat settling employees any differently.  Finally, the court rejected the argument that the jury had disregarded the jury questionnaire and assessed liability on the hospital for the nurses' conduct along with direct liability to the hospital.  The court must presume that the jury followed the trial court's written instructions.  The court's opinion may be found here.

CPRC 33.004(e) not applicable to vicariously liable defendants

The Houston (First) Court of Appeals recently held that section 33.004(e) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code does revive claims against defendants whose liability is solely vicarious.

Section 33.004(e) allows plaintiffs to join as defendants those designated as responsible third parties notwithstanding the applicable statute of limitations.  Plaintiffs in this case filed suit against Wells Fargo well after limitations had apparently expired.  Plaintiff then moved to join one of Wells Fargo's employees as a responsible third party.  After the court granted the motion, Plaintiff then joined the employee as a defendant.  Both Wells fargo and the employee sought summary judgment based on limitations and argued (1) that public policy barred the use of section 33.004(e) to circumvent limitations, (2) section 33.004(e) cannot revive claims on which the statute had run prior to enactment of Chapter 33, and (3) section 33.004(e) does not revive claims against parties who are only vicariously liable.

The court of appeals rejected the defendants' first argument as "without merit."  The court, however, agreed with the defendants that Chapter 33 cannot revive claims on which limitations had already expired prior to its passage.  Finally, the court held that a party that is only vicariously liable does not fit the definition of responsible third party in Chapter 33.  After reciting  the definition of responsible third party found in section 33.011(6), the court stated:

A party that is liable based purely on respondeat superior does not fit this definition.  The definition further underscores that section 33.004(e) should not be used to hold a party liable when no allegations have been made that the party caused or contributed to the claimant's damages.

The take home here is that employers whose liability is only vicarious cannot be designated "responsible third parties" under Chapter 33.  As a result, the court of appeals concluded that the plaintiffs' time-barred claims against Wells Fargo based on respondeat superior were not revived by section 33.004(e).  The court's opinion in Villareal v. Wells Fargo Brokerage Servs., LLC can be found at this link.