Medical Bills Are No Evidence of Proper Measure of Damages

The Tyler Court of Appeals recently held that evidence of medical expenses billed by medical providers is legally insufficient evidence of the amount of expenses "actually paid or incurred."  Plaintiff sued the defendant for injuries sustained in an auto accident.  Prior to trial, the plaintiff filed a motion to exclude any evidence of reductions, insurance payments, or other "evidence of collateral sources."  At trial, the plaintiff introduced evidence of medical expenses billed by medical providers in the amount of $110,069.12.  The defendant was not allowed to rebut this evidence with evidence of reductions even though it was undisputed that the amount of expenses actually paid after reductions was $14,482.02.  The jury found for plaintiff and awarded damages in the full amount requested by the plaintiff.  The defendant moved for jnov arguing the plaintiff had offered no evidence on the correct measure of damages.  The trial court denied defendant's motion and entered judgment on the jury's verdict. 

On appeal, the court held that CPRC sec. 41.0105 "not only limits the amount of damages recoverable, but also affects the relevance of evidence offered to prove damages."  The court further held that medical bills reflecting only the amount "initially incurred" are irrelevant and should be excluded at trial.  Consequently, the court held that the improperly admitted medical bills were legally insufficient evidence of the amount actually paid or incurred by the plaintiff.  However, because the medical bills constituted more than a scintilla of evidence to support at least some of the damages and the amount actually incurred was undisputed, the court suggested a remittitur in the proper amount amount of damages.  The court's opinion in Escabedo v. Haygood can be found at this link.

Reduce Damages Under CPRC 33.012 Before Applying Recovery Limitation in CPRC 41.0105

In what appears to be a case of first impression, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that sections 33.012(a) and 41.0105 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code should be harmonized by applying section 33.012(a)'s "damage" reduction before section 41.0105's "recovery" limitation.  In an opinion by Justice Moseley, the Court reasoned that because section 33.012(a) applies to the assessment of damages by the jury, and section 41.0105 applies to recovery of damages by the claimant, section 33.012(a) should be applied first.  In addition to the distinction between damages and recovery, the Court relied on section 41.0105's introductory phrase, "in addition to any other limitation under law" to support its holding that section 41.0105 gets applied last. 

The order of application can have significant consequences.  In this case, the jury found damages of $89,000, but found that the plaintiff was responsible for 50% of his damages.  Plaintiff had actually incurred just over $45,000 in medical expenses.  The trial court reduced the damages assessed by 50% resulting in damages of $44,500.  Since this amount was less than the medical expenses actually incurred, section 41.0105 did not apply.  Had the trial court applied section 41.0105 first, the damages would have been reduced to about $45,000, which would have been subject to further reduction by 50% under section 33.012(a).  The result would have been a judgment for $22,500 instead of $44,500, or as the Court notes, a $22,000 difference.  The Court's opinion in Irving Holdings, Inc. v. Brown can be found at this link.