Reverse and Render : Texas Appellate Lawyer & Attorney : Cowles & Thompson Law Firm : Court of Appeals, Texas Supreme Court

The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed a district court's order denying a plea to the jurisdiction that had been filed by the Texas attorney general, who had intervened in the proceeding for the purpose of contesting jurisdiction.  The court of appeals held that Texas district courts lack jurisdiction to grant divorces to same-sex couples legally married in other states.  Construing Texas Family Code Section 6.204(c), Justice Kerry FitzGerald, writing for a three-judge panel, held that section 6.204(c) "deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction."  The court further held that the state law prohibiting a divorce of parties to a same-sex marriage does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The court's opinion on In re J.B. & H.B. can be found at this link.

Mandamus aficionados may wish to study the portion of the court's opinion holding that the attorney general had no adequate remedy by appeal because of the exceptional nature of the case involving (1) principles of subject-matter jurisdiction, (2) constitutional challenges, (3) potential interference with the State's right to be heard, and (4) potential interference with the State's right to appeal the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction.

One issue not addressed was the district court's ruling that the State did not have standing to intervene.  The court of appeals avoided addressing the standing issue by reasoning that the district court had ruled the State lacked standing after the State had filed an interlocutory appeal to complain of the district court's earlier denial of the plea to the jurisdiction.   The court of appeals held that the district court's order addressing standing was signed in violation of the automatic stay set out in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 51.014(b).

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The Tyler Court of Appeals recently confirmed that individual federal tax returns are discoverable to the extent they are relevant and material.  In this case, the tax returns were relevant to the claims and the court found that the parties had agreed to the production of the returns.  But that was not the end of the matter.  The court of appeals also found that not all of the information contained in the tax returns was relevant.  Thus, the court of appeals held the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the tax returns produced in their entirety when only portions of the returns dealing with specific income were relevant.  Accordingly, the court of appeals conditionally granted the petition for writ of mandamus and ordered the trial court to vacate its order that the party to produce all individual tax returns from 1999 to the present in their entirety.  The court's opinion in In re Guniganti can be found at this link.

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The Fort Worth Court of Appeals recently held that an order directing that sanctions be paid prior to final judgment is an abuse of discretion unless the court makes express findings as to why the sanctions do not preclude the sanctioned party from continuing the lawsuit.  In this case, the trial court awarded over $19,000 in sanctions against the plaintiff for discovery abuse payable within thirty days.  The plaintiff filed a writ of mandamus arguing that the sanctions were unwarranted and, even if proper, the sanction should not have been payable within thirty days.  The court of appeals deferred ruling on the discovery issues and amount of the sanctions but held that the order to pay within thirty days was an abuse of discretion because the sanction threatened the plaintiff's ability to continue the lawsuit.  The Court stated:

If a litigant contends that a monetary sanction precludes access to the court, the district judge must either (1) provide that the sanction is payable only at a date that coincides with or follows entry of a final order terminating the litigation; or (2) make express written findings, after a prompt hearing, as to why the award does not have such a preclusive effect.

The Court denied the plaintiff's request for mandamus as to the propriety of the sanctions, but granted the petition and ordered the trial court to modify the sanctions order to provide that the sanctions be payable upon termination of the litigation.  The Court's opinion in In re Spence can be found at this link.

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After waiting more than a decade for some guidance from the Texas Supreme Court on the meaning of "net worth" in discovery matters, we thought we were going to get just that--at least until last Friday, that is.  In last Friday's orders, the high court granted the motion to dismiss filed by the real parties in interest.

I understand that the basis for the motion was that after the supreme court expressed interest and requested briefing, the real parties in interest went back to the trial court and asked the court to vacate its discovery order, which the court did.  The real parties then sought dismissal of the mandamus proceeding, and it appears that the court obliged.

I've written a couple of prior entries about the In re Jacobs case.  Those entries may be found here and here, for those curious to read more about Jacobs.   

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Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 171 allows a court to appoint a master in chancery "in exceptional cases, for good cause."  In its In re Behringer Harvard Tic Management Services LP opinion, the Dallas Court of Appeals reminded us of what the Texas Supreme Court said about "exceptional cases" almost 20 years ago.  A court's busy schedule and general reference to complexities of discovery do not make a case exceptional.  Thus, the court of appeals conditionally granted a petition for writ of mandamus to order the district court in this case to vacate an order appointing a special master to handle in camera review of documents.  The court's opinion may be found here.

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Sometimes when a party gets a default judgment against another party, there's a rush to make the judgment final.  But as American Express Centurion Bank and American Express Bank found out in In re Daredia, you've got to be careful about what you ask for because there are consequences.

In the trial court, the American Express entities sued two defendants, Pervez Daredia and Map Wireless, Inc.  Map Wireless did not answer, while Daredia did.  American Express took a default judgment that contained language reciting that the "judgment disposes of all parties and all claims in this cause of action and is therefore FINAL."  Oops.  Apparently, American Express forgot that there was another party--Daredia.

American Express realized its mistake only too late--after the trial court's plenary jurisdiction had expired.  At that time, American Express tried to correct the judgment with a motion for judgment nunc pro tunc.  The trial court granted the motion. 

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus, the Texas Supreme Court, in reliance on its opinion in Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., pointed out that Lehmann did not require that you use the exact language suggested in that opinion--only that the judgment reflect on its face an intent to make it final.  And the court held that this judgment did just that.   The court also reiterated the differences between errors made in entering a judgment, which are clerical, and errors made in rendering a judgment, which are judicial.  All too often state practitioners carelessly mix these concepts, but here we have a prime example of where the distinction is all the difference.  Here, the error was in the rendition of the judgment because the trial court rendered (signed) precisely the judgment American Express asked the trial court to render.

Because Daredia had no adequate remedy by appeal once the trial court set aside the final judgment, the Supreme Court held that mandamus relief was available.  The court's opinion may be found here.

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The Dallas Court of Appeals recently held that a trial court abused its discretion by ordering production of irrelevant net worth information.  The Court first acknowledged that "net worth is relevant and discoverable when punitive damages may be awarded."  The Court  noted the "corollary to that rule is that when punitive damages are not recoverable, information about net worth is not relevant and, as a result, not discoverable."  In this case, a patron had consumed alcohol and drove her vehicle causing an accident and injuring the plaintiffs.  The driver pleaded guilty to two counts of intoxication assault.  The plaintiffs sued the defendant for serving the driver "excessive amounts of alcohol."  The Court of Appeals, citing section 41.005(a) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, held that punitive damages were not recoverable against the defendant because the claims arose from the criminal conduct of another.  Because punitive damages were no recoverable, the net worth information was not relevant.  Accordingly, the Court conditionally granted the petition ordering the trial court to vacate its order compelling production of net worth information.  The Court's opinion in In re Islamorada can be found here.

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Few writs of mandamus are granted in Dallas, so when I see one in the daily case updates I like to check the opinion out.  I was glad I did so today!  The Dallas Court of Appeals issued an informative opinion today conditionally granting a writ of mandamus to vacate an order that compelled the production of information containing Goodyear's trade secrets. 

Although I generally consider discovery to be a 4-letter word (at least the process of drafting discovery requests and objecting to the other side's requests), the question of whether certain information is discoverable often provides for interesting legal research and analysis.  The question of whether documents should be protected from discovery on the basis of confidentiality or trade secret status is one of those interesting issues.  Too often, however, opinions don't include a detailed analysis of the arguments, objections, and evidence presented in the trial court on discoverability or lack thereof.  Today's opinion in In re the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company is an exception to that rule.

Justice Lang-Miers provides us with a detailed analysis of the evidence and arguments presented by both sides.  Although it appears that this was not really a close case -- Goodyear provided ample evidence to support its contention that the documents contained trade secrets -- the opinion gives good examples of what types of evidence should be filed to meet your burden of proof.  Those examples can be molded for use in other cases, products cases or otherwise.  The opinion also helps future parties on the losing end of a motion to compel to get a second bite at the apple.  The court did not determine whether the trade secret information is discoverable.  It simply held that Goodyear met its burden to prove the documents contained trade secrets and the plaintiff failed to meet her heightened burden of proving  that the information is necessary to a fair adjudication of her claim.  So, although the original order will be vacated, the plaintiff can return to the trial court and seek to compel production of the information again.  The court's opinion may be found here.

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Personal Jurisdiction challenges is one area of the law that I've found interesting since I took Dean Frank Newton's conflicts of law class in law school.  Recently there have been a number of personal jurisdiction opinions that have come out.   I've summarized what I see as the highlights of some of those cases below:

• In Jackson v. Hoffman, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that the filing of a faulty affidavit by the defendant did not waive the jurisdiction challenge.  The court also held that the defendant did not waive the jurisdiction challenge by filing a motion for sanctions in the court of appeals after the plaintiff appealed the order granting the defendant's special appearance.  The court's opinion may be found here.
• In Zinc Nacional, S.A. v. Bouche Trucking, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court held that the mere act of sending goods through Texas does not establish personal jurisdiction under a specific contacts analysis.  The court's opinion may be found here.
• In Touradji v. Beach Capital Partnership, L.P., the First Court of Appeals held that jurisdiction must be examined on a claim-by-claim basis insofar as examining specific jurisdiction.  The court further held that if the plaintiff does not plead sufficient jurisdictional facts, a defendant can meet its burden of negating jurisdiction merely by proving that it is not a Texas resident.  Finally, the court holds that unilateral acts of the plaintiff cannot be used to establish jurisdiction; it must be the defendant's purposeful conduct that established personal jurisdiction.  The court examines a number of individual claims pleaded in this case, and in that regard the opinion may be of interest for those wanting a more detailed review.  The court's opinion may be found here.
• In 2007 East Meadows, L.P. v. RCM Phoenix Partners, L.L.C., the Dallas Court of Appeals holds that specific jurisdiction is "dispute-specific."   The court futher holds that RCM Phoenix did not purposefully avail itself of Texas by using a third-party broker to market real property that was located in Indiana.  Finally, the court holds that where a contract gave the plaintiff the unilateral decision to select the location of the closing of the sale which never closed, the nonresident defendant could not be said to have purposefully availed itself of Texas law.  The court's opinion may be found here.

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This blog entry comes courtesy of Cowles & Thompson's Melinda Newman:

The Eastland Court of Appeals recently held that a trial court abused its discretion by refusing to hear a special appearance motion filed by a California corporation until after the defendant’s corporate representative appeared for deposition in Texas. In IRN Realty Corporation v. Hernandez, Vicenta Hernandez filed suit against IRN, alleging various causes of action stemming from the purchase of real estate in Nolan County. Prior to hearing its special appearance, Hernandez noticed the deposition of IRN’s corporate representative. IRN filed a motion to quash, urging the court to first rule on its special appearance and contending that it would be unjust for a Texas court without jurisdiction to require its corporate representative to appear for a deposition. The trial court granted the motion to compel, awarded monetary sanctions, and ordered IRN to present its representative for deposition before it would rule on the special hearing. After IRN ignored the court’s order and failed to present its representative for deposition, the trial court struck IRN’s pleadings.

The court observed Rule 120a’s mandate that a hearing on a special appearance be heard and determined before any other plea or pleading. It also noted, however, that the rule also specifically provides for the means of obtaining a continuance of the special appearance hearing so a deposition may be conducted: affidavits of the party opposing the special appearance. Here, Hernandez did not file any such affidavit stating that she could not present facts essential to justify her opposition to the special appearance or that she needed to depose IRN’s corporate representative regarding jurisdiction -- she simply noticed IRN’s corporate deposition. Thus, while the court made clear it did not condone the actions of IRN in refusing to obey a court order, it held that the trial court abused its discretion in abating the hearing on the special appearance and striking IRN’s pleadings. The court’s opinion may be found here.  One issue that was not addressed was location: i.e., had Hernandez properly submitted an affidavit and obtained a court order allowing the deposition, could she have forced the IRN representative to come to Texas for his deposition or would she have had to depose him in California?

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The Houston First District Court of Appeals has held that a trial court abused its discretion by denying the plaintiffs discovery of jurisdictional facts pertaining to the defendants' personal appearance.  In Lamar v. Poncon, John and Nanci Lamar sued Eric Poncon, Morgan's Rock Hacienda, and Ecolodge for negligence in causing injuries arising out of a car accident that occurred when the Lamars travelled to Nicaragua.  Morgan's Rock and Poncon filed special appearances to challenge the exercise of jurisdiction.

On three separate occasions, the Lamars moved for jurisdictional discovery, each time providing additional information as to what information they were seeking and why the jurisdictional discovery sought was needed.  Each time the trial court denied the request.   The trial court eventually sustained the special appearances, after which the Lamars appealed and complained of the rulings on their motions for discovery.

The court of appeals observes that Civil Procedure Rule 120a(3) governs jurisdictional discovery and under the rule, a party opposing a special appearance may have discovery into jurisdictional facts if it presents an affidavit that it cannot provide facts essential to justify its opposition to the special appearance.  The court held that a denial under this rule is governed by an abuse of discretion standard.  The court then recites all of the efforts the Lamars made to obtain the necessary information and concludes that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the jurisdictional discovery.  From a practitioner's standpoint, the court does not explain how the trial court's denial was a failure to follow guiding rules and principles or otherwise arbitrary.   Nor does the court indicate at what point (after the first motion, second motion or third motion, or all three), the denial of discovery constituted an abuse of discretion.

The court reverses an order granting the special appearance and remands the case to the trial court for further proceedings.  The court's opinion may be found here.

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The San Antonio Court of Appeals has held that a party challenging a default judgment may well risk losing the opportunity to challenge the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him unless special precautions are taken.

In Boyd v. Kobierowski, Kobierowski, a Texas resident, sued Boyd, a California resident, in Texas for breach of contract, fraud, misrepresentation and DTPA violations.  All causes of action arose from the sale of a vehicle  Boyd sold to Kobierowski. 

Boyd did not answer the suit and Kobierowski took a default judgment against Boyd.  Boyd subsequently filed a restricted appeal to challenge the default judgment.  He prevailed on appeal because of a defect in personal service.  See Appeal No. 04-06-0041-CV. 

On remand, Kobierowski repeatedly tried to get Boyd to answer the suit, but Boyd did not respond.  Kobierowski then took a second default judgment.  Boyd subsequently filed a special appearance and a motion for new trial subject to the special appearance.  The trial court denied the special appearance, but granted the motion for new trial.  In a second (interlocutory) appeal, Boyd argued that it was error to deny his special appearance.

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The Dallas Court of Appeals held that a pro se letter from an Illinois resident denying liability and requesting an extension of time to retain counsel and file a "complete answer" waived the defendant's subsequent special appearance.  The defendant argued that the letter did not consitute an answer.  The court held that  the letter constituted an answer.  Because an answer constitutes a general appearance, the court held the defendant waived any challenge to the trial court's personal jurisdiction.  The court's opinion in Triad Realty Servs., Ltd. v. Green can be found at this link.

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