Texas District Courts Lack Jurisdiction to Grant Divorces to Same-Sex Couples

The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed a district court's order denying a plea to the jurisdiction that had been filed by the Texas attorney general, who had intervened in the proceeding for the purpose of contesting jurisdiction.  The court of appeals held that Texas district courts lack jurisdiction to grant divorces to same-sex couples legally married in other states.  Construing Texas Family Code Section 6.204(c), Justice Kerry FitzGerald, writing for a three-judge panel, held that section 6.204(c) "deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction."  The court further held that the state law prohibiting a divorce of parties to a same-sex marriage does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The court's opinion on In re J.B. & H.B. can be found at this link.

Mandamus aficionados may wish to study the portion of the court's opinion holding that the attorney general had no adequate remedy by appeal because of the exceptional nature of the case involving (1) principles of subject-matter jurisdiction, (2) constitutional challenges, (3) potential interference with the State's right to be heard, and (4) potential interference with the State's right to appeal the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction.

One issue not addressed was the district court's ruling that the State did not have standing to intervene.  The court of appeals avoided addressing the standing issue by reasoning that the district court had ruled the State lacked standing after the State had filed an interlocutory appeal to complain of the district court's earlier denial of the plea to the jurisdiction.   The court of appeals held that the district court's order addressing standing was signed in violation of the automatic stay set out in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 51.014(b).

 

Discovery of Federal Tax Returns Limited

The Tyler Court of Appeals recently confirmed that individual federal tax returns are discoverable to the extent they are relevant and material.  In this case, the tax returns were relevant to the claims and the court found that the parties had agreed to the production of the returns.  But that was not the end of the matter.  The court of appeals also found that not all of the information contained in the tax returns was relevant.  Thus, the court of appeals held the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the tax returns produced in their entirety when only portions of the returns dealing with specific income were relevant.  Accordingly, the court of appeals conditionally granted the petition for writ of mandamus and ordered the trial court to vacate its order that the party to produce all individual tax returns from 1999 to the present in their entirety.  The court's opinion in In re Guniganti can be found at this link.

Sanctions Payable Prior to Final Judgment Abuse of Discretion

The Fort Worth Court of Appeals recently held that an order directing that sanctions be paid prior to final judgment is an abuse of discretion unless the court makes express findings as to why the sanctions do not preclude the sanctioned party from continuing the lawsuit.  In this case, the trial court awarded over $19,000 in sanctions against the plaintiff for discovery abuse payable within thirty days.  The plaintiff filed a writ of mandamus arguing that the sanctions were unwarranted and, even if proper, the sanction should not have been payable within thirty days.  The court of appeals deferred ruling on the discovery issues and amount of the sanctions but held that the order to pay within thirty days was an abuse of discretion because the sanction threatened the plaintiff's ability to continue the lawsuit.  The Court stated:

If a litigant contends that a monetary sanction precludes access to the court, the district judge must either (1) provide that the sanction is payable only at a date that coincides with or follows entry of a final order terminating the litigation; or (2) make express written findings, after a prompt hearing, as to why the award does not have such a preclusive effect.

The Court denied the plaintiff's request for mandamus as to the propriety of the sanctions, but granted the petition and ordered the trial court to modify the sanctions order to provide that the sanctions be payable upon termination of the litigation.  The Court's opinion in In re Spence can be found at this link.

Just say "no" to net worth

After waiting more than a decade for some guidance from the Texas Supreme Court on the meaning of "net worth" in discovery matters, we thought we were going to get just that--at least until last Friday, that is.  In last Friday's orders, the high court granted the motion to dismiss filed by the real parties in interest.

I understand that the basis for the motion was that after the supreme court expressed interest and requested briefing, the real parties in interest went back to the trial court and asked the court to vacate its discovery order, which the court did.  The real parties then sought dismissal of the mandamus proceeding, and it appears that the court obliged.

I've written a couple of prior entries about the In re Jacobs case.  Those entries may be found here and here, for those curious to read more about Jacobs.