Demonstration of Personal Knowledge in Affidavits

Beware of using "form" language in an affidavit to establish the affiant's personal knowledge of the facts A statement such as "I have personal knowledge of the facts in this affidavit," may not be adequate.  And the danger of getting it wrong is that the affidavit is legally insufficient.  

A good discussion of how far an affiant must go to establish personal knowledge is found in the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals' opinion in Valenzuela v. State & County Mutual Fire Insurance Co.   The court of appeals held that a "mere recitation that the affidavit is based on personal knowledge is inadequate if the affidavit does not positively show a basis for the knowledge."  "The affidavit must explain how the affiant has personal knowledge." (emphasis added).

 

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Restrictions on the Use of Special Masters

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 171 allows a court to appoint a master in chancery "in exceptional cases, for good cause."  In its In re Behringer Harvard Tic Management Services LP opinion, the Dallas Court of Appeals reminded us of what the Texas Supreme Court said about "exceptional cases" almost 20 years ago.  A court's busy schedule and general reference to complexities of discovery do not make a case exceptional.  Thus, the court of appeals conditionally granted a petition for writ of mandamus to order the district court in this case to vacate an order appointing a special master to handle in camera review of documents.  The court's opinion may be found here.

Final Judgments: Be Careful What You Ask For

Sometimes when a party gets a default judgment against another party, there's a rush to make the judgment final.  But as American Express Centurion Bank and American Express Bank found out in In re Daredia, you've got to be careful about what you ask for because there are consequences.

In the trial court, the American Express entities sued two defendants, Pervez Daredia and Map Wireless, Inc.  Map Wireless did not answer, while Daredia did.  American Express took a default judgment that contained language reciting that the "judgment disposes of all parties and all claims in this cause of action and is therefore FINAL."  Oops.  Apparently, American Express forgot that there was another party--Daredia.

American Express realized its mistake only too late--after the trial court's plenary jurisdiction had expired.  At that time, American Express tried to correct the judgment with a motion for judgment nunc pro tunc.  The trial court granted the motion. 

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus, the Texas Supreme Court, in reliance on its opinion in Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., pointed out that Lehmann did not require that you use the exact language suggested in that opinion--only that the judgment reflect on its face an intent to make it final.  And the court held that this judgment did just that.   The court also reiterated the differences between errors made in entering a judgment, which are clerical, and errors made in rendering a judgment, which are judicial.  All too often state practitioners carelessly mix these concepts, but here we have a prime example of where the distinction is all the difference.  Here, the error was in the rendition of the judgment because the trial court rendered (signed) precisely the judgment American Express asked the trial court to render.

Because Daredia had no adequate remedy by appeal once the trial court set aside the final judgment, the Supreme Court held that mandamus relief was available.  The court's opinion may be found here.

Another Mandamus on Net Worth

The Dallas Court of Appeals recently held that a trial court abused its discretion by ordering production of irrelevant net worth information.  The Court first acknowledged that "net worth is relevant and discoverable when punitive damages may be awarded."  The Court  noted the "corollary to that rule is that when punitive damages are not recoverable, information about net worth is not relevant and, as a result, not discoverable."  In this case, a patron had consumed alcohol and drove her vehicle causing an accident and injuring the plaintiffs.  The driver pleaded guilty to two counts of intoxication assault.  The plaintiffs sued the defendant for serving the driver "excessive amounts of alcohol."  The Court of Appeals, citing section 41.005(a) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, held that punitive damages were not recoverable against the defendant because the claims arose from the criminal conduct of another.  Because punitive damages were no recoverable, the net worth information was not relevant.  Accordingly, the Court conditionally granted the petition ordering the trial court to vacate its order compelling production of net worth information.  The Court's opinion in In re Islamorada can be found here.